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______________________________________________________________________ The "Zeitschrift für
Semiotik": Abstracts ______________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________ Robert E. Innis Hanna Buczynska-Garewitz Wolfhart Henckmann Peter M. Simons The overcoming of association psychology through sign-theoretical analysis: James, Peirce, Husserl and Bühler Robert E. Innis, University of Lowell, Massachesetss Summary. In his book of 1927, "Die Krise der Psychologie", Karl Bühler
formulated the four basic assumptions which characterized the theory of association around
1890: 1. According to the "subjectivistic axiom", experiences are the subject of
psychology and self-observation is the only legitimate method for their analysis; 2. the
"atomistic axiom" claimed all contents of consciousness to be complextions of
elementary ideas; 3. the "sensualistic axion" declared elementary ideas to be
nothing but sense data (including emotions); 4. the "mechanistic axiom" assumed
that the course of mental life as well as the structure of complex experiences is
determined by contiguity associations. The present essay shows how criticism of these
assumptions led James, Peirce, and Husserl towards a semiotic approach, which was
subsequently set out explicitly in Bühler’s "Sprachtheorie" of 1934. James
developed his notion of the stream of consciousness in order to overcome the atomistic and
mechanistic axioms; Peirce devised his conception of interpretants in order to reject the
subjectivistic axiom and the introspectivism connected with it; Husserl attacked the
sensualistic axiom with his theory of meaning acts. Jointly, these discussions
demonstrated that the processes of consciousness are sign processes. Bühler’s
"Sprachtheorie" drew the consequences for the semiotic analysis of linguistic
communication.
The controversy over psychologism in Twardowski, Kotarbbiski and Ingarden Hanna Buczynska-Garewitz, Holy Cross College, Massachusetts Summary. Semiotics as a self-contained discipline is based on the concepts of sign and meaning. The understanding of these concepts was considerably enhanced by the Warsaw-Lwów School of Philosophy, which was founded in 1895 by Twardowski and continued by his students Kotarbinski and Ingarden. The main attention of the Warsaw-Lwów School was focused on the problem of distinguishing between the psychological and logical aspects of sign processes. What is the relation between a sign, its meaning, and the acts of understanding performed by the sign users? Is a sign real object or the content of an idea? Are meanings presupposed in mental acts or are they produced by them? Is the relation between a sign and its meaning a casual one or the result of sign users’ intentions? Are semiotic problems accessible to empirical methods of research or must they undergo logical analysis? What mode of being do the meanings of literary texts have with respect to the books in which they are printed, to the people who read them, and to their performances on the theater stage? These are questions which were treated differently by Twardowski, Kotarbinski and Ingarden. The present article presents their answers and discusses them critically. Consciousness and reality in Külpe and Gomperz: two alternatives in the philosophical foundations of semasiology Wolfhart Henckmann, University of Munich Summary. Although Külpe’s object theory and Gomperz’ "Weltanschauungslehre" differed with respect to basic positions and general interests, there were similarities in the sign conceptions of the two authors. Both emphasized that it is the specific function of signs which distinguishes them from concepts and objects. Both characterized a sign by contrasting its form (in the case of the proposition, its "linguistic form") with its conceptual aspect ("propositional content") and its object ("propositional foundation"). On this basis Gomperz defined the relations of expression (of a content through a sign form), of reference (to an object through a sign from), and of conception (of an object through a content). But while Külpe regarded the relation of reference (arbitrarily produced indication) as fundemantal, Gomperz considered the reference relation to be semasiologically irrelevant and concentrated on the meaning relation which holds between the sign expression and the object conception. Whereas signs were for Külpe nothing but conventional means of indication, Gomperz took them to be unified entities and attempted to explain how it is possible for them to have a meaning. He taught that a sign is a substance which incorporates the accidentals of the object referred to. This solution allowed Gomperz to describe signs without taking into account their use, whereas the essential feature of signs for Külpe was their functioning in communication. That which doesn't exist: the Meinong-Russel controversy Peter M. Simons, University of Salzburg Summary. Most commentaries on the Russell-Meinong debate have been content to portray it from Russell’s point of view. By following the course of the controversy in some detail, we show it to have been more complex and less one-sided than usually depicted. Both philosophers initially stressed their agreement, but the fundamental differences as to whether there are non-existent objects and whether the usual laws of logic apply without restriction soon became prominent. On these basic issues, neither budged. But in the course of the controversy, they practically swapped positions on the theory of meaning. Russell jettisoning the remnants of a three-tiered theory of meaning for a two-tiered one, Meinong meanwhile interposing a third tier. Russell’s influence on Meinong lasted longer and was more positive than conversely, but both benefited from the exchange, and provided paradigms for later theories of reference and meaning. |
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